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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS
OF THE PAN-AMERICAN COPYRIGHT
CONVENTION OF 1946
BRYCE REA, JR.O
On June 22, 1946, delegates of all of the members of the Pan-Amer-
ican Union signed at Washington, D. C., a new Inter-American Con-
vention on the Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific, and Artis-
tic Works. The Convention is based on a Draft prepared by the Juri-
dical Division of the Pan-American Union, and emerged from a con-
ference of twenty-two days held under the auspices of that Union pur-
suant to a resolution adopted by the Eighth International Conference
of American States at Lima, Peru, in 1938. The Convention is not yet
in force in the United States or in any other signatory country since, as
of this writing, it has been ratified only by Mexico, and by its terms, is
ineffective until ratified by at least two states. The purpose of this ar-
ticle is to report the more significant provisions of the Convention, to
discuss their possible legal effects, and to compare them with some of
the established principles of the American Copyright Law.
The Anglo-American common law has long recognized that liter-
ary and artistic creations are the property of their creators.' The right
in them is defined as an absolute and exclusive incorporeal right to the
composition, and the protection which the common law gives it differs
in no respect from the protection given similar rights in other forms
of personal property.2 However, since the maintenance of a property
right at common law requires the exercise of dominion and control
over the property, it follows that from a dedication of it to the public
there will be implied the abandonment of the incorporeal heredita-
ment. Consequently, the essence of common law copyright under the
American rule -is merely the right of first publication, for the general
distribution of a literary or artistic work is a dedication to the public
and results in the loss of the common law right therein.3
OAttorney for The National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D. C. The
opinions here expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent
those of The National Association of Broadcasters.
12 Blackstone Com. 405.
2Caliga v. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co., 157 Fed. 186 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1907), aff'd,
215 U. S. 182, 54 L. ed. 15o (igog); Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937).
3Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 8 L. ed. 1055 (1834). The rule in Great Britain
is contra. Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408 (H. of L. I774), held that the English
common law gave authors perpetual property rights, regardless of publication.
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It is obvious from the foregoing that the common law copyright is
ineffective as a means of fully protecting the practical value of most
literary and artistic works, for it is only by making such works known
to the public that their creators can secure any substantial return for
their intellectual labor. And while the performance of plays and music,
4
the exhibition of works of art, 5 and the delivery of lectures6 are not
normally publication in legal effect, the reproduction and general sale
of copies is.7 The first legislative recognition of and attempt to rem-
edy this inadequacy of the common law was made by the British Parl-
liament, which, in 1710, passed the famous Statute of Anne.8 This
statute gave British authors or their assigns the exclusive right to
publish their works in Great Britain for a maximum period of 28 years.
Although at the time of the adoption of the American Constitution
this example had been followed and there was copyright legislation in
five states,9 the history of statutory copyright in the United States really
begins with the Constitution, which gave to the Congress the power
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 10 For the purpose of the discus-
sion here there is no need to review the various exercises of this power
by the Congress. It is enough to say that the first act was passed in 1790,
and that legislation continued in an irregular, sporadic, and piecemeal
way until the Act of 19o9, entitled "An Act to Amend and Consolidate
the Acts Respectiig Copyright.""
Contrary to the law in England,12 the American copyright statutes
and the decisions of American courts have established the principle
that the existence and exercise of the constitutional power of the Con-
gress to grant statutory copyright has not supplanted common law
copyright.13 Consequently, although the two are mutually exclusive
'Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424, 56 L. ed. 492 (1912).
'American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 52 L. ed. 208 (19o7).
0Nutt v. National Institute, 31 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
7Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jeweler's Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241,
49 N. E. 872 (1898).
88 Anne, ch. 19 (1710). In the light of Donaldson v. Beckett, supra, note 3, this
statute in fact restricted the common law right.
OConnecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Virginia.
IU. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8.
"17 U.S.C.A. i, et. seq.
'*Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408 (1774), holding that an author had at com-
mon law a perpetual right to print and publish his work and that that right had
been abolished by the Statute of Anne.
"Caliga v. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 54 L. ed. 150 (19o9); Am-
erican Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 52 L. ed. 2o8 (19o7); Dieckhaus
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and the procuring of the former constitutes the irrevocable abandon-
ment of the latter,14 an American author may in the first instance elect
to rely on either.
As to foreign authors American courts will, in accord with usual
principles of comity, afford them the same protection at common law as
Americans have.1 However, until i8gi, statutory copyright was ex-
pressly limited to citizens or residents of the United States. In that
year the protection of the copyright act was extended to foreigners' 6
on three conditions, namely, (i) that there be compliance with the
formalities of notice on the work,17 registration and deposit of copies,'
3
as required of Americans, (2) that all printing, lithographing, photo-
engraving and binding be performed in the United States,19 and (3)
that the state of which a foreign applicant was a citizen or subject
grant substantially similar privileges to Americans, the existence of
which privileges to be determined and proclaimed by the President.
20
The Act of 19o9 modified the condition requiring domestic manufac-
ture to the extent of excepting books in languages other than English
and books in raised characters for the use of the blind 21 As so modi-
fied, the Act of 1891 is in this respect the law today.
In contrast to this development of American copyright law on a
national basis throughout the nineteenth century, European copy-
right law developed on an international basis. As literary and artistic
works gained increasing monetary value the need for something more
than protection limited to the territory of a single state became ap-
v. 2oth Century-Fox Film Corp., 54 F. Supp. 425 (E. D. Mo. 1944). It is to be noted
that the common law here referred to is the common law of the various states,
since it "is clear that there can be no common law of the United States." Wheaton
v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 658, 8 L. ed. 1055, io8o (1834). Thus in Ketcham v. New York
World's Fair, 34 F. Supp. 657 (E. D. N. Y. 194o), it was held that the cause of action
for violation of an intellectual property right having arisen in New York, the law
of that state applied.
'"The procuring of a statutory copyright is tantamount to publication, Bobbs
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 2d, igo6), affd, 210 U. S. 339, 52 L ed.
io86 (19o8), is an election between statutory and common law copyright and con-
stitutes an abandonment of the latter. Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social
Uplift Film Corp., 220 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
"Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424, 56 L. ed. 492 (1912); American Tobacco Co.
v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 52 L. ed. Ro8 (19o7).
8l 7 U.S.C.A. 8.
1717 U.S.CA. 9.
"17 US.C.A. IL, 12.
2217 US.C.A. 15.
9017 U.S.C.A. 8.
aAct of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1078, 17 US.C.A. 15.
[Vol. IV
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parent. To meet this need Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Italy, Spain and Switzerland formed, at Berne, in 1886, an Interna-
tional Copyright Union "for the protection of the rights of authors
over their literary and artistic works." 22 The signatory countries agreed
to protect the works of authors of all members of the Union in ac-
cordance with the Convention.
The essence of the international system established at Berne was
threefold. First, the types of works entitled to protection under the
treaty were defined.23 Second, minimum rights in those works were
established.24 Third, copyright having been procured in one country
of the Union, all of the other countries agreed to afford the copy-
righted work the protection of their respective laws and the protection
of the Convention without any formality.
This Convention was revised at Berlin in 19o8 and again at Rome
in 1928. The most important modification deals with the third point
above. As revised, the Convention now requires every member of the
Union to grant without any formality the protection of its laws and the
protection of the Convention to any work not originating in that state
which, if published, was published in a Union country not later than
it was published elsewhere, or which, if unpublished, is the work of an
author within the jurisdiction of one of the countries of the Union.
The country of origin of unpublished works is the country "to which
the author belongs." The country of origin of published works is the
country of first publication. If publication takes place simultaneously
in two or more countries the country of origin is the Union country
which offers the shortest term of protection.
25
Thus it will be seen that there are three basic differences between
the principles of copyright as they have developed nationally in the
United States and as they have developed internationally in the Copy-
right Union. First, the United States has only conditionally extended
any statutory copyright protection to foreigners. Second, the United
States has refused to grant any substantive rights to foreigners which
have not been created solely by American law and granted to American
citizens or residents. Third, the United States has consistently required
compliance with the formalities of the American law as to notice on
the work, registration and deposit of copies. It is these basic differences
2Berne Convention of x886, Art. I.
nBerne Convention of 1886, Art. IV.
24Berne Convention of x886, Arts. V, VI, VII, IX, X.
2Rome Convention of 1928, Art. 4-
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which have prevented American adherence to the Berne Convention
despite numerous efforts to that end made from time to time since its
adoption in 1886.2
6
Although there are now more than 3o adherents to the Berne Con-
vention, none of the members of the Pan-American Union except
Brazil is among them. Within the Pan-American Union itself there
is in existence only one copyright agreement of any importance. 27 This
is the Buenos Aires Convention of 191o, which has been adhered to
by fourteen countries, including the United States. By this agreement
nationals or domiciled foreigners of any state party thereto who ob-
tain copyrights in one state are entitled to protection in the other signa-
tory states in accordance with their laws without the necessity of com-
plying with any formality, provided their work bears a statement in-
dicating the reservation of copyright.
The new Convention will replace the Buenos Aires Convention, as
well as all others among any of the parties, but will not affect rights
acquired under them.28 Since it approaches the principles of the Berne
Convention, it is much more far-reaching and all-embracing than any
previous inter-American agreements. Basically, it establishes, without
regard to the domestic law of the countries signatory to it, a group of
enumerated substantive rights in literary and artistic works, and re-
quires each signatory state to grant these rights without any formality
to all persons, other than its citizens or domiciled aliens, who are citi-
zens or domiciled aliens of any contracting state and have procured
copyright in accordance with the law of that state.
Article II gives "the author of a literary, scientific, and artistic
work the exclusive right to use and authorize the use of his work, in
whole or in part; transfer the right in any manner, in whole or in part;
and transmit it by will or by operation of intestate laws." The article
then grants the author certain specific exclusive uses, "and such other
uses as may hereafter be known. .. ." Briefly, these are reproduction,
adaptation, arrangement and diffusion, and public exhibition, pre-
sentation and performance. The only exceptions to this broad grant
of rights are found in Article VI (2), which permits the reproduction
by the press 29 of articles on current events in newspapers and maga-
"For a history and discussion of these efforts see Ladas, International Protection
of Literary and Artistic Property, Vol. II § 396 (Macmillan 1938).
27For a complete list of Inter-American agreements see Ladas, supra, note 26,
App. II.
uryxt. XVII().
N*uery: Is the term "press," as used here, broad enough to embrace other
[Vol. IV
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zines in the absence of a "special or general reservation" therein,3 0 and
in Article XII, which permits the reproduction of brief extracts of
protected works for the purposes of instruction, research or criticism.
This concept of use established by Article II, while well settled
in American patent law, is comparatively new in American statutory
copyright law. The traditional distinction between a patent and a copy-
right is that the former gives an exclusive right to use31 while the latter
gives an exclusive right to copy. 32 Thus, except for a limited right in
the use of a narrow class of works by performance, 33 the American
copyright law is concerned only with unauthorized copying.
However, as a practical matter Article II grants three rights not
granted in the American law. First, the author of a protected work is
given the exclusive right to perform it publicly, whether or not for
profit. Under the present American law only the holder of a copyright
in a dramatic or musical work or in a lecture, sermon, address, or similar
production has any right with respect to performance. This right is
limited to public performance for profit,34 except in the case of a
drama, where it is extended to any public performance 3 5
media of mass communication such as radio, motion picture news reels, news maga-
zines?
nThe differentiation between a special and general reservation would seem to
be meaningless in view of the last clause of Article VI(2): "identification of the
author by name shall constitute such a reservation in those countries in which the
law or custom so considers it." By American law the reservation of copyright in a
newspaper is the reservation of copyright on all material therein eligible therefor.
See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 63 L. ed. 211 (1918).
Most Latin-American countries either follow this rule-e.g., Chile, Law of March
17, 1925-or hold that publication over a name is a reservation of right-e.g., Ar-
gentina, Law of September 28, 1933.
ftAldrich v. Remington Rand, 52 F. Supp. 732 (N. D. Tex. 1942).
"-The true definition of 'copyright' is the sole right of multiplying copies."
Jeweller's Circ. Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83, 94 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922),
cert. den. 259 U. S. 581, 66 L. ed. 1074 (1922). The zeal with which the courts adhere
to this distinction is illustrated by Patterson v. Century Productions, 93 F. (2d) 489
493 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. den. 3o3 U. S. 655, 82 L. ed. 1114 (1938), which held
that the showing of a motion picture is the exclusive right of the copyright owner
because projection on the screen is copying. "... when the film was shown the de-
fendants who did that made an enlarged copy of the picture. It was to be sure tem-
porary but still a copy while it lasted...."
"'This right is of comparatively recent origin. Thus it was not until 1856 that
authors of copyrighted plays were given exclusive performance rights. Palmer v.
DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532, 7 Am. Rep. 480 (1872).
"uPerformance for profit does not require the charging of an admission fee. To
paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes' famous remark in Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U. S. 591,
595, 61 L. ed. 511, 514 (1917), holding that the playing of music in a restaurant was
performance for profit whether it pays or not, if the purpose of employing it is
profit, that is enough.
wA performance may be public notwithstanding that it is not in a place where
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Second, the author of a protected work is given the exclusive right
to "adapt and authorize general or individual adaptations of it to in-
struments that serve to reproduce it mechanically or electrically." This
right was specifically set forth, and the clause embodying it was care-
fully drawn for the purpose of changing American law. That law
grants only the owner of a musical copyright the right to prevent only
the first mechanical reproduction of it. Having made, permitted, or
acquiesced in one such use he must permit all other such uses upon
payment of a royalty of two cents for each reproduction.36
Third, although the Convention does not so provide in terms,
American courts will probably hold that the author of a protected work
is given the exclusive right to perform or authorize the performance
of his work in coin-operated machines. The American copyright act
expressly provides that the rendition of a musical composition in coin-
operated machines is not a "public performance for profit unless a fee
is charged for admission to the place where such reproduction or ren-
dition occurs."37 Earlier drafts of the Convention gave the author the
exclusive right to authorize the use of his work in coin-operated ma-
chines. This clause was stricken on the ground that it was unnecessary
in view of the other language of Article II, and presumably the min-
utes of the Convention will so show. Specifically, the clause giving the
author the exclusive right-to perform his work publicly by means of
mechanical instruments, and the clause giving him the right to "diffuse
it ... by any method now known or hereafter devised and which may
serve for the reproduction of signs, sounds or images .... " would
seem to make an express provision superfluous. Furthermore, it is to
be noted that unauthorized performance by coin-operated machines
constitutes infringement under the American statute where an ad-
mission fee is charged. Consequently, it would appear that the theory
of the statute is that unless a fee is charged the performance, though
it may be public, is not for profit.3 9 If this is so, Article II would clear-
the public is assembled. Thus a radio performance is public. Remick v. Amer.
Auto Access., 5 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925). In Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty
Co., 283 U. S. 191, 75 L. ed. 97, (1931), a hotel furnished private rooms with loud-
speakers and headsets wired to a master radio set for the convenience of guests. It
was held that the reception of music on such speakers and headsets was a public
performance for profit separate and distinct from the original performance by the
broadcasting station.
Z517 U.S.C.A. i(e).
V7 7 U.S.C.A. .(e).
-Art. II(e).
0It may be argued that the theory of the statute is that the mere making of
[Vol. IV
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ly outlaw such unauthorized use, since under it profit is not a criterion
for protection.
In addition to the protection afforded by Article II, Article XI re-
serves to the author, in disposing of his copyright "by sale, assignment
or otherwise," the right to claim paternity in the work and to oppose
any modification or use of it which prejudices his reputation. In con-
trast to the law of Latin America and the Berne Convention, this
doctrine of moral right has never been recognized in the American
copyright statutes. Under the American statute, as interpreted by the
courts, a copyright is indivisible and nothing less than all of the rights
secured to the proprietor can be assigned. In other words there can be
no partial assignment of particular rights or privileges.40 However, it
cannot be doubted that one holding an American copyright may li-
cense its use on such terms and conditions and with such restrictions
as he sees fit.41 The significant difference between an assignment and a
license is that an assignee may sue for infringement in his own name,
while a licensee must join the copyright proprietor as party plaintiff.42
Furthermore, there is dictum to the effect that the holder of an unre-
stricted license to elaborate an original work is under an implied ob-
ligation "to retain and give appropriate expression to the theme,
thought, and main action of that which was originally written.
'43
In any event, Article XI provides that the moral right can be dis-
posed of or waived at any time "in accordance with the provisions of
the law of the State where the contract is made." Consequently, the
principal difference between the Convention and the American law is
one of procedure. By the former the right is reserved in the absence
of action to pass it. By the latter the right is passed in the absence of
action to reserve it. Unfortunately, however, it is not dear whether
the reference to the "law of the place where the contract is made" is to
music available to such individual persons as care to play the machine is not a
public performance. But compare Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191,
75 L. ed. 971 (1932), supra, note 35. Whatever the theory, if any, the purpose of the
proviso seems to have been to prevent monopoly. Standard Music Roll Co. v. Mills,
241 Fed. 360 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1917).
"Eliot v. Geare-Marston, Inc., 3o F. Supp. Soi (E. D. Pa. 1939), and cases there
cited.
"Manners v. Morosco, 252 U. S. 317, 64 L. ed. 590 (1920); Manners v. Famous
Players Laski, 262 Fed. 811 (S. D. N. Y. 1919).
"Widenski v. Shapiro etc., 147 F. (2d) gog (C. C. A. ist, 1945); Buck v. Elm
Lodge, 83 F. (2d) 2o (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). This rule stems from Waterman v. Macken-
zie, 138 U. S. 252, 34 L. ed. 923 (i8go), applying the principle to suits for infringe-
ment of patents. Goldwyn v. Howells, 282 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
"sCurwood v. Affiliated Distributors, 283 Fed. 219 (S. D. N. Y. 1922).
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the law of the place where the waiver is made or to the law of the
place where the disposal of the copyright is made. It would seem to be
to the latter, for there is nothing to indicate that the waiver of the
moral right must be in the form of a contract, while the disposal is
spoken of in terms-of sale or assignment, both of which imply a con-
tractual relationship. This question is important because in some of
the Latin American states it is at least doubtful whether there can
be a lawful waiver of the moral right.44 Consequently, a user, to be sure
he has a complete right, must take pains to make all contracts of sale,
assignment, and license in a state which permits a waiver of the moral
right and to secure waivers in accordance with the law of that state.
Finally, Article XIV extends protection to titles which, as a result
of the international fame of the works to which they are attached,
have acquired a distinctive character. Their use on other works is pro-
hibited without the consent of the author, unless such other works "are
so different in kind or character as to preclude any possibility of con-
fusion."
It is well settled that a copyright under the American statute con-
fers no exclusive right to the title of the work.45 Indeed, on the author-
ity of the Trade Mark Cases, 46 it seems clear that the Congress cannot
constitutionally protect titles to literary or artistic works by virtue of
its power with respect to patents and copyrights. Those cases held
that trademarks, since they were generally the adoption of something
already in existence, lacked the originality necessary for constitutional
protection as inventions, discoveries or writings.
However, as those cases show, the right to the exclusive use of a
symbol or a form of words to distinguish one's goods or property has
long been recognized at common law in England and in the various
states, and will be protected in an action at law or in equity. In fact,
the law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair com-
petition,47 and courts can and do exercise their inherent power to pre-
vent unfair competition to give some protection to titles. This power
"Rome Convention of x928, Article 6 bis: "(i) Independently of the patrimonial
right of the author, and even after the assignment of the said rights, the author re-
tains the right to claim the paternity of the work, as well as the right to object to
every deformation, mutilation or other modification of the said work, which may be
prejudicial to his honor or to his reputation."
15Becker v. Loew's Inc., 133 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943), cert. den. $ig U. S.
772, 87 L. ed. 1720 (1943), and cases cited therein.
"1oo U. S. 82, 25, L. ed. 550 (1879).
4'American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372 , 70 L ed. 317 (1926);
Kroll Bros. v. Rolls-Royce, 126 F. (2d) 495 (Ct. of Cus. g& Pat. App., 1942).
[Vol. IV
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is exercised if a title is not merely generally descriptive, but has ac-
quired a secondary meaning and a distinctive character that identifies
it in the mind of the public with the copyrighted work to which it is
affixed. Having met these conditions, its unauthorized use or imitation
in such a way as to injure the original user's right to exploit his work,
and to confuse and mislead the public will ground an action for in-
junction or damages or both.
48
Furthermore, while the Convention deals with copyright, it deals
with it in its aspect as and from the standpoint of foreign commerce.
It will apparently have no effect upon the copyright law governing
American citizens or residents. Therefore, just as the Congress can
constitutionally protect some trademarks by virtue of its power over
interstate commerce, 49 so here, it would seem that it can protect some
titles by virtue of its power over foreign commerce.
The nature of the protection afforded by the Convention having
been set out, Article III lists a variety of protected works and concludes
by extending protection to any "literary, scientific, or artistic work
that can be published or reproduced."5 In addition, Article V pro-
tects, "without prejudice to the copyright in the original works" "trans-
lations, adaptations, compilations, arrangements, abridgements, drama-
tizations, or other versions of literary, scientific, and artistic works .... "
The broad language of Article III raises a question as to whether
the Convention purports to extend protection to works which have not
been reduced to physical form. Reading the entire section it would seem
not, for all of the classes of works enumerated, with two exceptions, are
normally written, within the legal meaning of that term. As for the
exceptions, "lectures, addresses, lessons, sermons, and other works of
a similar nature" are protected only in their "written or recorded ver-
sions," -and "choreographic works and pantomimes" are protected only
where "the stage directions... are fixed in writing or other form."
However, it seems clear that works reduced to physical form only
as mechanical records are entitled to protection. This is a radical de-
parture from American law. The term writings, as used in the Consti-
IsWarner Bros. v. Majestic Pictures, 70 F. (2d) 3io (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Patten v.
Superior Talking Pictures, 8 F. Supp. 196 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); Paramore v. Mack
Sennett, 9 F. (2d) 66 (S. D. Cal. 1925).
"United Drug Co. v. Rectamus Co., 248 U. S. go, 63 L. ed. 141 (1918).
mArtide LV(2) provides that: "Works of art made principally for industrial
purposes shall be protected reciprocally among the Contracting States which now
grant or shall in the future grant protection to such works." Article IV(3) excepts
from the protection of the Convention "the industrial utilization of scientific ideas."
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tution, has long had a broader meaning than simply books. The orig-
inal copyright act of 1790 included also maps and charts. Prints were
added in 1802, muscial compositions in 1831, photographs and nega-
tives thereof in 1865, paintings, drawings, statues, models and designs
in 187o. However, the Congress has never extended the statute to per-
mit the copyrighting of records. Rather, as was stated above, it has
merely given musical copyright holders a limited right to prevent the
unauthorized reproduction of their works on such records. This lim-
ited right was given by the Act of 19o9. Prior to that Act it had been
held that the making of mechanical reproductions of copyrighted music
was not such a copying as would give rise to a cause of action for in-
fringement. "In no sense can musical sounds which reach us through
the sense of hearing be said to be copies ....
Furthermore, two opinions of the Supreme Court of the United
States raise doubt as to whether such records can be considered writ-
ings, as that term is used in the Constitution. In Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphing Co. v. Sarony, the Court defined the term to "include all
forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, etc., by which the ideas in
the mind of the author are given visible expression." 52 In White-Smith
Music Co. v. Appollo Co., the Court said: "A musical composition is
an intellectual creation which first exists in the mind of the com-
poser; he may play it for the first time upon an instrument. It is not
susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a form which others
can see and read .... 53
Nevertheless, in accordance with established principles of constitu-
tional construction, it can logically be held that, as the copyright act
may be applied to situations not anticipated by the Congress, 54 so the
language of the Constitution may be applied to situations not antici-
pated by its framers. In fact, it was on this principle that the Supreme
Court held the granting of protection to photographs constitutional
in the Sarony case, the very case whose definition of writings as the
visible expression of an author's ideas would exclude mechanical
records. Consequently, if, as suggested, Article III is limited to works
"White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Appollo Co., 209 U. S. 1, 52 L. ed. 655
(i9o8) (concerning music roles); Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D. C. 562 (igoi) (concern-
ing phonograph records).
52111 U. S. 53, 58, 28, L. ed. 349, 351 (1884). (Italics supplied)
3209 U. S. 1, 17, 52 L. ed. 655, 662 (i9o8). (Italics supplied)
"Remick v. American Auto Accessories, 5 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), hold-
ing that the fact that radio was not developed at the time the Copyright Act was
enacted does not exclude it from the statute.
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reduced to physical form, it is not at variance with the Constitution so
long as that form is one "in which the thought of an author may be
recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced." 55
If then, Article III gives protection to works reduced to physical
form only as mechanical records, Article V by extending protection,
inter alia, to adaptations, arrangements and other versions of works,
seems to make possible a copyright in the audible rendition of a work
distinct from any copyright in the work itself. This also will be a radical
departure from American law. As has been said, the Congress has never
authorized the copyrighting of intellectual creations in the form of
records. A priori, there can be no copyright in the audible performance
of works, since only by means of such records can sound be preserved
and reproduced. However, it has been held that there is a common law
property right in such renditions which the courts will protect.56 In
any event, there would seem to be no difference in principle between
the protection of audible and the protection of visible renditions.
Both may be original and of great intellectual, artistic and monetary
value. The fact that the American statute now protects the latter by
permitting the copyrighting of motion picture film is a substantial ar-
gument for extending protection to the former.
Articles IV and IX state the conditions on which works entitled
to protection under Articles III and V will receive the protection
afforded by Article II. Article IV (i) provides first that: "Each of the
Contracting States agrees to recognize and protect within its territory
the rights of authors in unpublished works," and second that the "pres-
ent Convention shall not be construed to annul or limit the rights of
an author in his unpublished works .... "
It would appear that the effect of this language is to make publi-
cation a condition precedent to protection under the Convention and
at the same time to obligate each of the Contracting States to protect
unpublished works by its domestic law without respect to the Con-
vention. This is the only tenable interpretation when Article IV(i) is
read as a whole, for if the Convention were intended to extend to un-
published works, the provision that it should not annul or limit rights
OThis is the language used by the Congress in 17 U.S.C.A. i(e) in extending to
musical copyright holders rights with respect to the mechanical reproduction of
their works.
64Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Ad. 631 (1937); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F.
Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939). See also Nat. Assoc. of Performing Artists v. Win. Penn
Co., 38 F. Supp. 531 (E. D. Pa. 1941). Cf. R. C. A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.
(2d) 86 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o).
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in such works would be meaningless. Moreover, since in no place does
the Convention limit protection in terms to published works, mention
of unpublished works would be superfluous were it intended to treat
both classes in the same way. Furthermore, Article 111(2) of the Pan-
American Draft Convention, from which this Article evolved, left un-
published works to be governed by the law of the place where the pro-
tection was claimed. It was understood at the Conference that the
present provision was substituted to emphasize the principle that the
use of unpublished works requires the consent of the author.
Although it speaks of published works the Convention does not de-
fine publication. Earlier drafts tried to, -but because of differences of
opinion among the various delegations as to the proper definition,
based on differences in the laws of the various states, all attempts were
finally abandoned. Neither does it state what law courts shall follow
in determining whether there has been a publication, the law of the
place .vhere protection is claimed, the law of the place where the acts
took place, or the law of the place of the author's nationality or domi-
cile. It is not clear from the decisions which law American courts will
refer to. In American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,5 7 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the exhibition of a British paint-
ing in a gallery in London did not constitute a general publication.
The opinion, by Mr. Justice Day, discussed only the circumstances of
the exhibition and the application of general common law principles
to those circumstances. There was no reference to the British copyright
law. On the other hand, in Ferris v. Frohman,58 the question was
whether the performance of an uncopyrighted British play in London
had destroyed the common law copyright in the United States. In hold-
ing that it had not, Mr. Justice Hughes relied on both British and
American law. Since, by the British statutes, performance of a play
is deemed equivalent to publication of a book, 59 it was argued that
the English authors had, by the law of their domicile, lost their com-
mon law right. In answer to this the Court said that the British statutes
did not purport to curtail any rights outside of British dominions. The
statutes "disclose no intention to destroy rights for which they pro-
vided no substitute. There is no indication of a purpose to incapacitate
British citizens from holding their intellectual productions secure...
in other jurisdictions .... Their right was not gone simpliciter, but
52o7 U. S. 375, 52 L. ed. 254 (1907).
223 U. S. 424, 433, 56 L. ed. 492, 496, (1912).
55 & 6 Vict. c. 45, § 20 (1842).
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only in a qualified sense for the purpose of the statutes...." The
Court then went on to point out that public performance of an un-
published play did not deprive the owner of his common law rights
except by statute and that the American statute had no such effect.
In principle, the creation of legal rights by the acts claimed to con-
stitute publication can be determined only by the law of the place
where those acts occurred. Creating no rights there, they create none
anywhere, and the inquiry of the court is complete. Creating rights
there, they create them everywhere, and being in existence, they should
be enforced unless public policy forbids. 60 It is difficult to see how pub-
lic policy can forbid enforcement in this case, since the purpose of the
Conveniton, which, if ratified, will be the purpose of the United States,
is to grant its protection without respect to the domestic law of the
signatory states.
On the question of formalities, the Convention strikes a compro-
mise between the law of the United States, which makes compliance
with the formalities of its Act mandatory as to all works,61 and the law
of the Berne Convention which dispenses with all formalities so long as
the work is first published in a contracting state or is by an author
within the jurisdiction of such state.62 Article IX provides that a work
properly copyrighted in any one of the signatory states by a national
or an alien domiciled therein is entitled to protection in all of the
other signatory states without compliance with any formality.
At the outset it may be said that this article does not violate any
basic prindples of American law, for it is nothing more nor less than
the common law conflict of laws doctrine of comity. One's right in per-
sonal property, valid by the law of the place of its creation, is valid
everywhere, and will be enforced by the law of the forum unless its en-
forcement contravenes the public policy of that law.6 American courts
have applied this doctrine with respect to the common law of literary
property."
Considering Article IX in the light of the American statute, it is
00SIater v. Mexican R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 48 L. ed. 900 (19o4).0117 U.S.C.A. 9, 11, 12,1x3.
WRome Convention of 1928, Art. 4.
0 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. 198 (1918). See also supra,
note 60.
"Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424, 56 L. ed. 492 (t912); American Tobacco Co.
v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 52 L. ed. 208 (1907); Brown v. Select Theatres Corp.,
56 F. Supp. 438 (D. C. Mass. 1944); Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532, 7 Am. Rep.
48o (I872).
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at variance with the principle of that statute, which requires the for-
malities of registration and deposit of copies as to all works, and notice
on published works. The purpose sought to be served by these re-
quirements is the protection of the public from innocent infringement
of copyright by making known the existence of a claim of exclusive
right to the work and the name of the claimant.65 Therefore, it is well
to consider, in examining the change which would be effected by the
Convention, the extent to which the requirements as to formalities ful-
fill this purpose.
The requirements of registration and deposit of copies do not ac-
complish this purpose. First, as to unpublished works, an exclusive per-
petual property right exists at common law and will be protected with-
out regard to the copyright statute. Indeed, it has been held that this
right is not lost even though an attempted registration and deposit
was refused or failed for want of compliance with the statute and the
regulations thereunder. 66 As to published works, failure to register and
deposit will not defeat an otherwise valid copyright except after demand
by the Register of Copyrights therefor. 67 In other words compliance
with these requirements is not a condition precedent to a valid copy-
right. Rather, it is merely a condition precedent to suit for infringe-
ment.68 Consequently, it is no defence to a suit for infringement,
whether innocent or intentional, 69 that there had been no registration
and deposit at the time the infringement occurred.
70
Second, even though all works are immediately registered and de-
posited, the copyright office, unlike the patent office, does not ex-
6sBurrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony, iii U. S. 53, 28 L. ed. 349 (1884);
Smith v. Wilkinson, ig F. Supp. 841 (D. C. N. H. 1937).
O'Dieckhaus v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film, 54 F. Supp. 425 (D. C. Mo. 1944).
6717 U.S.C.A. 13.
as17 U.S.C.A. 1.
eA showing of intention by the defendant to infringe a copyright is not es-
sential to recovery of damages. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 8i F. (2d) 49
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. den., 298 U. S. 669, 8o L. ed. 1392.
¢'Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 3o6 U. S. 3o, 83 L. ed. 47o (1939). The
Court reversed the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which had
held that it was contrary to the general purpose of the Act to allow recovery
where the infringement occurred before a tardy deposit. The majority reasoned that
publication with notice made it known that immediate copyright existed, that
the statute did not define the requirement of deposit "promptly," and that the
statute barred suit not unless but until deposit was made.
Under the prior Act deposit was.necessary not later than the day of publication.
Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1107. It was the harshness of this requirement that led to the
modification found in the present statute. Mittenthal v. Berlin, 291 Fed. 714 (S. D.
N. Y. 1933).
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amine them for originality, for under Section 3 of the Act,71 works may
be copyrighted notwithstanding that they contain matter which is in
the public domain or which has been previously copyrighted.72 Thus
a copyright, standing alone, is no more than a claim of right which may
be defeated by showing that the work has been plagiarized either from
one in the public domain or from one copyrighted by another, this,
coupled with the fact that the copyright office merely indexes them by
title, author, copyright owner and publisher, if any, means that there
is no practical way in which a prospective user can determine whether
or not a claim of copyright is valid.
Third, assuming a work has been registered and deposited, there
is no assurance that it will remain on deposit, for Section 6o of the
Copyright Act 78 authorizes the copyright office to destroy or return to
the copyright proprietor from time to time such articles as are not
considered "desirable or useful to preserve in the permanent files."
Thus, the only formality which serves a useful purpose74 vis a vis
the public is that of notice of copyright on published works. Since such
notice is a pre-requisite to a valid copyright,75 prospective users can
determine the existence of a claim of copyright, and, of more impor-
tance, are informed of the name of the claimant.76 In addition, this re-
quirement is supplemented by a more or less abortive attempt to apply
the principles of the recording acts. Under Section 44 of the Act bona
fide purchasers for value without notice take free of any assignment not
recorded in the copyright office within three months of its execution in
the United States or within six months of its execution elsewhere.
77
However, since a prospective purchaser or assignee can at no time re-
ly on the absence of a record of assignment as proof that one has not
been made within six months, this section is of little value.
The Convention is silent on the subject of assignments in this re-
spect, thereby giving rise to the question of the applicability of Sec-
tion 44 of the American statute to works protected by it. On the one
1117 U.S.C.A. 3.
72See Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 2d, 192o).
U57 U.S.C.A. 6o.
"'Apart from this discussion, the deposit of copies serves the purpose of adding
to the collection of the library of Congress and other Government libraries in the
District of Columbia. 17 U.S.C.A. 59 requires the Librarian of Congress to "de-
termine what books and other articles shall be transferred to the permanent col-
lections of the Library of Congress," and what others shall be placed in the reserve
collection for sale or exchange or transfer to other -Government libraries.
717 U.S.C.A. 9. Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 3o6 U. S. 30, 83 L. ed. 470
(1939); Deward v. Bristol Savings & Loan Corp., i2o F. (Rd) 537 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1941).
'"Supra, note 65.
171 7 US.C.A, 44-
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hand, it is arguable that the section is applicable on the theory that
treaties will be construed, if reasonably possible, to avoid the impair-
ment of domestic legislation.7 8 On the other hand, it is arguable that
the requirements of Section 44, being a part of the American Act and
designed to apply to works protected under that Act, cannot be ex-
tended to works protected otherwise.
The duration of the protection afforded by the Convention is in
accord with the principles of the Berne Convention.7 9 It is fixed by
Article VIII as that period allowed in the state where copyright was
originally obtained, with the proviso that it not exceed the period al-
lowed in the state where protection is claimed. Since the American
Act provides for two successive periods of twenty-eight years each, the
Article includes a clause requiring computation in such cases to be on
the basis of the aggregate of both periods.
The minimum remedies to be afforded in the event of infringe-
ment of works protected under the Convention are set out in Article
XIII. All infringing publications or reproductions are required to be
seized by the "competent authorities" either "at the instance of the
goirernment or upon petition by the owner of the copyright." Infring-
ing presentations or performances of plays or musical compositions are
required to be enjoined upon petition by the injured copyright owner.
This Article changes the American law by extending to the Gov-
ernment the right to institute proceedings for the seizure of infringing
copies. Under the present American Act the United States has author-
ity to institute proceedings for the seizure and condemnation only of
works imported in violation of the copyright law.8 0'
Of more importance, this Article seems to make seizure and/or in-
junction mandatory upon a showing of infringement. In contrast,
Section 36 of the American Act provides for injunction only "accord-
ing to the course and principles of courts of equity"8' and on such terms
as the court deems reasonable. Thus, the petitioner must come into
court with clean hands.82 Courts will refuse to enjoin the performance
"Guaranty Trust Co. v. U. S., 304 U. S. 126, 82 L. ed. 1224 (1938).
v0The Rome Convention of 1928, Art. 7, § i, provides that the protection granted
by it is for the life of the author plus fifty years. However, under § 2, if this period
is not made uniform in all member countries, duration is regulated by the law of
the country where protection is claimed, so long as it does not exceed the term
fixed in the country -of origin of the work.
M17 U.S.CA. 32.
ft 7 US.C.A. 6.
"T. B. Harms etc. v. Stern, 231L Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
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of an infringing play or motion picture if it is possible to eliminate the
infringing portions.83 An innocent infringer who has ceased infringing
after notice will not be enjoined.M
These remedies are to be granted "without prejudice to pertinent
civil remedies or criminal action." Since it is contemplated that there
will be only two bodies of law in any signatory state, the law of the
Convention and the domestic law of that state, it follows that the per-
tinent remedies here referred to are those pertinent under the domestic
law of the state in which protection is sought.
Under the present law of the United States the remedy in damages
is pertinent where a work has been copyrighted in accordance with
the requirements of the American Act. Works protected only by virtue
of the Convention do not fall within this class. Not having been copy-
righted in compliance with that Act, it follows that the remedies there-
in provided are not necessarily pertinent and that courts would not
be bound to award the damages there provided. This is significant,
because the American Act requires the award of minimum damages
in the amount of $250.0o85 for each infringement, where actual dam-
ages are not proved. Whether the infringement is innocent or inten-
tional is irrelevant.
On the other hand, works entitled to the protection of the Con-
vention having been published, the common law right in them has
been abandoned. However, it does not follow from this that the rem-
edy in damages is not pertinent at all. Legal rights having been created
and "competent authorities"-i.e., the courts-having been given au-
thority to protect them, they can be protected by any means within the
inherent jurisdiction of the courts, including the award of damages
for their violation where, in the circumstances, such an award is the
exercise of sound judicial discretion.
Under Article VII suit against an infringer may be brought by the
person "whose name or known pseudonym is indicated on a protected
work" as the author, or, in the case of "anonymous or pseudonymous
works whose authors are not known," by the publisher. It would seem
13Dam v. Kirke LaShelle Co., 166 Fed. 589 (C. C. N. Y. i9o8), aff'd, 175 Fed. 902
(C. C. A. 2d, 191o); Cravens v. Retail Credit Assoc., 26 F. (2d) 833 (D. C. Tenn. 1924);
International Film Service v. Affiliated Distributors, 283 Fed. 229 (S. D. N. Y. 1922).
"Smith v. Wilkinson, 97 F. (2d) 5o6 (C. C. A. ist, 1938).
S17 U.S.C.A. 25. In the case of a newspaper reproduction of a photograph the
minimum is $5o. In the case of the innocent use of a non-dramatic work in a motion
picture there is no minimum.
Jewell-LaSaUe Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U. S. 202, 75 L. ed. 978 (193t); Tiffany
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that no change in Rule 17 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
requiring suits to be brought in the name of the real party in interest,
will be necessary to give effect to this Article in the United States. By
way of exception that Rule permits one authorized by statute to sue in
his own -name.
As soon as two or more states deposit instruments of ratification
with the Pan-American Union the Convention is to come into force
as to those states.3 7 Since its protection is not limited to works produced
and copyrighted subsequent to that date, all works in which there
is a subsisting copyright in any signatory state on that date will become
entitled to protection under it. This will result in the extension of pro-
tection in the United States, as well as in other countries, to many
works now in the public domain. However, to avoid some of the hard-
ship in this grant of retroactive protection, provision is made for the
indefinite continuation without liability of any utilization of such
works "involving expenditure or contractual obligation."88 This pro-
vision is a paraphrase of that incorporated in Section 8 of the American
Act in 1941,89 allowing continued use for one year of works which be-
come entitled to copyright as a result of a proclamation by the Pres-
ident that reciprocal conditions exist between the United States and
a foreign country. Prior to the amendment of 1941, the Copyright Act
was silent on this subject. As far as can be ascertained there has been
no litigation either as to the extent of the rights of foreigners prior
to 1941,90 or as to the meaning of the phrase "expenditure or con-
tractual obligation" since 1941.
In conclusion, two general considerations may be mentioned. First,
it may be argued that in some respects-e.g., in protecting titles and in
protecting works reproduced only on mechanical records-the Con-
vention is at variance with the Constitution of the United States. This
raises the question as to whether the President and the Senate can do
by treaty what the Congress cannot do by legislation. This quesiton has
never been definitively answered. The Constitution makes treaties the
Productions v. Dewing, 50 F. (2d) 911 (D. C. Md. 1g3i); Advertisers Exchange v.
Bayless Drug Store, 50 F. Supp. 169 (D. C. N. J. 1943). Where the proof discloses
that no damages were sustained, the statutory minimum is not allowable. Washing-
tonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 78 App. D. C. 287, 14o F. (2d) 465 (1944).
wArticle XX.
8'Article XVII (2).
"OAct of Sept. 25, 1941, C. 421, 55 Stat. 732, 17 U..C.A. 8
9See 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 64 (1911), stating that a German citizen, who complied
with the Copyright Act between the date Section 8 became law and the date of the
President's proclamation with respect to Germany, may maintain an action for an
infringement which occurred between such dates.
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supreme law of the land when they are made under the "Authority of
the United States," and Acts of Congress the supreme law of the land
when they are made pursuant to the Constitution.91 The precise mean-
ing of the phrase "authority of the United States" is unsettled. It has
been stated by the Supreme Court that the power to make treaties is
not unlimited by the Constitution and does not go "so far as to author-
ize what the Constitution forbids."92 Nevertheless, the limitations
"must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act
of Congress could not deal with, but that a treaty followed by such an
act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring
national action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere reside
in every civilized government' is not to be found."
93
Second, the question arises as to whether the treaty is self-executing
upon ratification or whether it will be necessary for the Congress to
implement it by legislation before its provisions may be given effect.
In the United States a treaty, unless its terms import only an execu-
tory contract between sovereignties, is the law of the land equivalent to
an Act of Congress immediately upon its ratification. As such, it repeals
all prior inconsistent laws and, insofar as it grants private rights, is en-
forceable in the courts.9 4 A treaty may contain "provisions which con-
fer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations...
which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable
of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the coun-
try .... A treaty then, is the law of the land as an act of Congress is,
whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the pro-
vate citizen or subject may be determined. And when such rights are
of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the
treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a
statute." 95
Applying these principles, the Convention under discussion would
seem to be self-executing. The Contracting States grant unconditional-
ly certain private rights and certain private remedies to certain private
persons. In the preamble it is stated that the Governments of the Amer-
ican Republics have concluded the Convention "to give effect" to its
QIU. S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2.
2Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 266, 33 L. ed. 642, 644 (189o).
"Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 433, 64 L. ed. 641, 647 (1920).
"Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314, 7 L. ed. 415, 436 (1829); Asakura v. City-of
Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 68 L. ed. 1o41 (1924).
6Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 72 App. D. C. 234, 114 F. (2d) 464 (1940).
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purposes. By Article I the Contracting States "agree to recognize and
protect rights ... in accordance with the present Convention." Article
VII provides that "the courts of the Contracting States shall admit
actions..." brought by certain private persons. Article XIII provides
that in such actions certain reproductions "shall be seized" and cer-
tain performances "shall... be enjoined" upon petition by certain pri-
vate persons. Article XX provides that the Convention shall "come
into force... as soon as" instruments of ratification are deposited in
the Pan-American Union. In short, the Convention throughout pur-
ports to define categorically and completely the nature and scope of
the rights it creates, the classes of persons to whom those rights are
given and the conditions for their exercise. At no place is implement-
ing legislation by any Contracting State made such a condition.
No attempt has been made to draw any conclusions as to whether
this Convention should or should not be ratified by the Senate of the
United States. The practical ramifications of the changes it would
effect in the copyright law in the businesses of creating, publishing,
adapting, producing and performing literary and artistic works are
proper considerations in the drawing of such conclusions, and are be-
yond the scope of this article.
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